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NOT IN PUBLIC! THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEVISES A TwO-STEP TEST
FOR PUBLIC PERFORMANCES UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Columbia Pictures Industries v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.,
866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Professional Real Estate Investors,
Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
that hotel guest rooms are not "public" under the Copyright Act (the
Act)' in determining whether a hotel infringes on the copyright holders'
right of public performance by renting videodiscs and authorizing their
use on hotel equipment.'
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., through its hotel resort La
Mancha Private Club & Villas (La Mancha), rented movie videodiscs to
its hotel guests.4 La Mancha equipped each room with a videodisc
player and large screen projection television.5 Columbia Pictures, Inc.
and six other motion picture studios6 (Columbia) brought suit under the
Act to prevent La Mancha from renting videodiscs to its guests,7 alleging
infringement of their exclusive right to control the public performance of
their copyrighted motion pictures.'
1. 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1988)).
3. 866 F.2d at 280-82.
4. Id. at 279.
5. Id. La Mancha rented videodiscs from its lobby gift shop for a daily fee of $5.00 to $7.50
per disc. La Mancha employees also were available to help explain to guests the operation of the in-
room equipment. Id.
6. The other six motion picture companies were Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Productions, Warner Bros., Inc.,
and Embassy Pictures. CBS, Inc. was another plaintiff to the action. Id. at 278.
7. The Copyright Act authorizes a court to "grant temporary and final injunctions on such
terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 502(a) (1988). See also id. §§ 503-505 (other remedies for infringement); id. § 506 (criminal
offenses).
8. 866 F.2d at 280. Columbia argued that La Mancha violated § 106(4) of the Copyright Act,
which grants the copyright holder the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly."
Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988) (emphasis added). Two clauses of§ 101 of the Act define the term
"publicly within the phrase "[t]o perform or display a work publicly." A performance takes place
"publicly" under clause (1) (the "public place" clause) if it occurs "at a place open to the public or at
any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered," and under clause (2) (the "transmit" clause) if someone "transmit[s] or
otherwise communicate[s] a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or
to the public .... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See 866 F.2d at 280.
Columbia argued that La Mancha publicly performed the videodisc movies under both clauses.
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The district court granted La Mancha's motion for summary judg-
ment, concluding as a matter of law that the movies on videodisc were
not performed "publicly" within the meaning of the Act.9 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision and held: a hotel does not violate
a copyright holder's exclusive right of public performance when it per-
mits guests to rent videodiscs for viewing in their own rooms on hotel-
provided equipment. 1"
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act provides that a copyright owner
has the exclusive right to perform publicly certain types' of copyrighted
works or to authorize public performance of such works.' 2 Elsewhere,
the Act defines as public a performance that occurs "at a place open to
Id. at 280-8 1. While the scope of this Comment is limited to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
public place clause, the Professional Real Estate court also applied the transmit clause. Id. at 281-82.
The court considered the words "transmit or otherwise communicate" crucial to the issue of
whether La Mancha performed publicly under the latter clause. Id. at 281. The court held that La
Mancha did not "communicate" the videodisc performances because the performances did not in-
volve a "'process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are
sent'." Id. at 282 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101, which defines "transmit"). The court refused to read
the transmit clause broadly, stating that "[i]f any transmission and reception occurs, it does so en-
tirely within the guest room; it is certainly not received beyond the place from which it is sent." Id.
9. Id. at 279. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 743 (C.D. Calif. 1986).
10. 866 F.2d at 282.
11. Besides motion pictures and audiovisual works, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) applies to "literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, [and] pantomimes .... "
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988). See supra note 8. See also 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 8.14[A], at 8-135 (1989). Section 106(4) provides for one of the five fundamental rights the
Act grants to copyright holders: reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and display.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5).
A corollary of the public performance issue is whether a work actually has been "performed." See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); 2 M. NIMMER, supra, §§ 8.03, 8.12, 8.14[B; N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT
LAW §§ 5.1-.13, .16-.18 (1981). The definition of "perform" under the Act is very broad:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Turning on a television set at home or singing in the shower may be "per-
formances." See Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill: Recent Develop.
ments in Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, ARIz. L. REv. 475, 484, 489 (1987).
These performances, however, are not actionable under copyright law because they are not "public"
performances. Id. at 484. The statutory definition of "perform" makes it clear that playing a vide-
odisc or video cassette constitutes a performance of the recorded movie. See H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 64 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5677. See also 2 M. NIMMER, supra, § 8.14[A], [B]; N. BOORSTYN, supra,
§ 4.5.
In Professional Real Estate, neither party disagreed that the movies had been "performed" within
the meaning of the Act. 866 F.2d at 279-80. The narrow issue in Professional Real Estate was
whether La Mancha had performed the copyrighted works "publicly." Id. at 280.
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the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside
of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered."' 3
Courts interpreting the Act's public performance right must decide,
among other things, whether the setting for the performance meets this
abstract definition.
The Third Circuit, in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Home,
Inc., 14 considered what constituted a "public" performance of a vide-
odisc or video cassette. In Redd Home, a video cassette shop rented
video cassette tapes15 to its patrons and also provided them private
booths in which to view the tapes. 6 Copyright holders claimed that the
showings of their copyrighted motion pictures were unauthorized public
performances in violation of their exclusive rights. 7 Using the definition
of "publicly,"' 8 the court posed the question whether the performance
occurred in "a place open to the public."' 9
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (the "public place" clause). Section 101 also defines "publicly"
under its "transmit" clause. See supra note 8.
14. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 158-59. Video cassette rental for home viewing has not been challenged in the courts.
Indeed, the plaintiffs in Redd Home conceded that rental for home viewing was not at issue. 749
F.2d at 156. Similar copyright questions often focus on exceptions to a copyright holder's exclusive
rights, such as the exception of the "first-sale" doctrine. The first-sale doctrine dictates that once
tangible copies of a copyrighted work are sold, the copyright holder no longer has exclusive distribu-
tion rights as to those particular copies. See generally 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.12 [B], at 8-
132.
The first-sale doctrine has been codified in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988). Pro-
fessor Nimmer maintains that the first-sale doctrine includes the right to rent the copyrighted work
without the copyright holder's consent. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.12, at 8-131. But see
Colby, The First Sale Doctrine, The Defense That Never Was?, 32 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 77, 81, 83
(1984) (arguing that the language of§ 109(a) undermines the inclusion of rentals within the first-sale
doctrine). One should therefore distinguish this right to distribution from the right of public per-
formance at issue in Redd Home and Professional Real Estate.
16. 749 F.2d at 156-57. The video store played the movies for each booth from a central loca-
tion. Id. at 155-56. The court noted that any member of the public could view a video cassette by
paying a fee. Id. at 159.
17. Id. at 157. The plaintiffs in Redd Home were the same seven filmmakers that sued in
Professional Real Estate. See 866 F.2d at 278; supra note 6.
18. See supra note 8.
19. 749 F.2d at 159. The Redd Home court concluded that Congress intended the public place
clause's first phrase, "a place open to the public," to operate independently of the second phrase, "a
substantial number of persons." Id. at 158. See supra note 8. According to the court, while the first
simply refers to "a place open to the public," the second describes what the court referred to as a
semi-public place, depending on the size and composition of the audience. 749 F.2d at 158.
The Redd Home court noted that Congress added the second phrase "to expand the concept of
public performance by including those places that, although not open to the public at large, are
accessible to a significant number of people." Id. (citing House Report). Congress intended to clar-
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In answering that question, the Redd Home court found the entire
store, and not the individual booth, to be the relevant unit of analysis.20
Notwithstanding that the booths, once rented, were private,2 the court
considered the video store essentially a movie theater with the added fea-
ture of privacy.22 Concluding that the video store was a public place, the
court held that the video store publicly performed copyrighted video-
tapes in violation of the Copyright Act.23
ify that, contrary to prior law, performances of copyrighted works at "semi-public" places infringed
on the rights of the copyright holder. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5677-78. Such semi-public places included "clubs, lodges, facto-
ries, summer camps and schools." Id. Congress considered routine meetings of government or busi-
ness personnel not to be "public" for copyright purposes. Id. at 64, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5678. For a thorough discussion of public performances in otherwise private
places, see Shipley, supra note 12, at 495-99.
20. 749 F.2d at 159. The Redd Horne court stated that "[s]imply because the cassettes can be
viewed in private does not mitigate the essential fact that [the store] is unquestionably open to the
public." Id. The court, thus, found it unnecessary to determine whether the video store was a
"place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered." Id. (refusing to apply the second part of the "public place" clause of
§ 101). See supra notes 8, 19.
21. 749 F.2d at 159.
22. Id. at 159.
23. Id. The Third Circuit found that the transmit clause of§ 101 further supported its conclu-
sion that the video store had performed the video cassettes "publicly." Id. See supra note 8. Citing
the legislative history, the court stated that "a performance made available to the public at large is
'public' even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place .... The same principles apply
whenever the potential recipients or the transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such
as the occupants of hotel rooms...." Id. (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 64-65, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5678). Thus, the court noted that the transmission of
a performance to the public, even in private settings such as homes or hotel rooms, constitutes a
public performance. Id. The Redd Home court also recognized that "'if the same copy .. of a
given work is repeatedly played (i.e. "performed") by different members of the public, albeit at
different times, this constitutes a "public" performance'." Id. (quoting 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 12,
§ 8.14[C][3], at 8-142) (emphasis in original).
Professor Nimmer apparently anticipated a Redd Home-type situation. The court, quoting Pro-
fessor Nimmer, stated:
[O]ne may anticipate the possibility of theaters in which patrons occupy separate screening
rooms, for greater privacy, and in order not to have to await a given hour for commence-
ment of a film. These too should obviously be regarded as public performances within the
underlying rationale of the Copyright Act.
Id. The Redd Home court explained that, although the video store owns a single copy of each video,
it repeatedly rents the copy to many members of the public. The court concluded that such a prac-
tice constitutes a "public" performance. Id.
Under Professor Nimmer and the Third Circuit's reasoning, the repeated and aggregate rental of a
video yields a public performance of the video, and private, individual viewing of the video does not
detract from such a conclusion. Nimmer himself has explained that home viewing of rented video
cassettes logically should constitute copyright infringement. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.14[C]
at 8-145 to -146. See also Comment, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate
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In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Aveco, Inc.,24 the Third Circuit ex-
tended Redd Home's definition of "publicly" to situations involving only
the authorization of a performance.25 Similar to the circumstances in
Redd Home,26 the defendant Aveco rented video cassettes and also pro-
vided rooms for viewing them.27 As in Redd Home, the in-store rooms,
once rented, were private-allegedly only family members and social ac-
quaintances could join customers.2 8
In its attempt to distinguish Redd Home factually, Aveco pointed to
two factors. 29 First, the video cassette players in Aveco were under the
customer's control in each room, rather than under employees' control in
the public lobby.30 Aveco also maintained that it charged for the rental
of the video cassette viewing room and the rental of the video cassettes
separately, 31 and, unlike in Redd Home, its employees did not perform
anything.32
In Aveco, however, the Third Circuit found Redd Home indistinguish-
able.13 The court stated that "[its] opinion in Redd Homne turned not on
the precise whereabouts of the video cassette players, but on the nature of
[the defendant's] stores."134 According to the court, the fact that custom-
Investors, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. 743 (C.D. Calif 1986), 2 COPYRIGHT L.J. 102, 103 (1986). However,
video cassette rental does not infringe, according to Nimmer, because of the first-sale doctrine. See
supra note 15. Home viewing of rental cassettes has not been challenged successfully in the courts;
indeed, the plaintiffs in Redd Home conceded that rental for home viewing was not at issue. 749
F.2d at 157.
24. 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
25. Id. at 63.
26. See 749 F.2d at 156-57.
27. 800 F.2d at 61.
28. Id. •
29. Id. at 62-63.
30. Id. at 63. In Redd Home, an employee "performed" the video cassette by playing it on a
centrally located video cassette recorder, which carried the movie over cables to the booths. 749
F.2d at 155-56. In Aveco, however, the customer took physical custody of the video cassette and
played it on a video cassette player in one of the rooms provided. 800 F.2d at 63.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id. at 63. The Third Circuit explained that although Aveco employees did not play the
tapes, they authorized customers to do so. Id. at 62. Section 106(4) prohibits such an authorization.
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988). The court refused to limit its holding in Redd Home to situations in
which the performance occurs in a public lobby. 800 F.2d at 63. See supra note 12 (the Act's
definition of "perform"). See also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.14[C], n.48.1 (discussion of
lower court opinion).
33. 800 F.2d at 63.
34. Id. (emphasis added). The court stated that the availability of a viewing room and video
cassette to the public, and "not the coincidence that the video cassette players were situated in the
lobby," made the video store in Redd Home a public place. Id.
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ers operated the video cassette players meant only that the video store
infringed the copyright by authorizing public performances, rather than
by actually performing the copyrighted material.35  Because authorizing
public performances is an equally exclusive right of copyright holders,36
the Aveco court refused to distinguish Redd Home.37
In Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp.,38 the Fourth Circuit
addressed the public performance question in a different context. Red
Baron, a video arcade company, had obtained electronic video game
boards on the "gray market" without the permission of Taito, the manu-
facturer and copyright holder.39  Red Baron installed Taito's circuit
boards in its video game machines and charged the general public
twenty-five cents per game.4°
The court in Taito addressed the issue whether a video arcade owner's
35. Id. at 62. Furthermore, a customer's individual control over a booth does not necessarily
make it private. The court noted that "[a] telephone booth, a taxi cab, and even a pay toilet are
commonly regarded as 'open to the public,' even though they are usually occupied only by one party
at a time." Id.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988).
37. 800 F.2d at 63.
38. 883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989).
39. Id. at 277. Taito had manufactured the video boards in Japan, and had valid Japanese and
U.S. copyrights on the boards. Id. It sold several boards outright, along with a license to "perform"
them in Japan-that is, put them in video machines for use in arcades-to another Japanese com-
pany. Id. Red Baron somehow obtained these boards on the "gray market"-either from the sec-
ond Japanese company or through a middleman-and imported them to the U.S., installing them in
video machines and placing them in their arcades. Id.
Taito maintained that Red Baron's mere possession and use of the boards violated Taito's valid
U.S. copyright. Id. at 276. The district court applied the first-sale doctrine and held that Red Baron
was not infringing. Id. at 277-78. See supra note 15.
On appeal, Taito conceded that Red Baron could buy and import the boards, but maintained that
Red Baron's public performance of the video game constituted an infringement of Taito's rights
under § 106 of the Act. 883 F.2d at 277. The Taito court explained that § 109(a) of the Act, codify-
ing the first-sale doctrine, refers only to the § 106(3) right of distribution. Id. at 280. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106(3), 109(a) (1988); supra notes 12, 15. All other § 106 rights, including the right of public
performance, still belong exclusively to the copyright holder. 883 F.2d at 280. See supra notes 8, 12.
40. 883 F.2d at 280. The court first established that a video game is a copyrightable audiovisual
work. Id. at 278. Next, the court concluded that each activation of the game led to a "perform-
ance." Id. at 279 (quoting Williams Elec., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.
1982)). The court then analyzed whether Red Baron's performances of the video game were "pub-
lic" under § 106(4) of the Copyright Act. Id.
A consensus is emerging that computer ROMs are copyrightable works (as opposed to non-copy-
rightable mechanical devices). See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982); A. MILLER, SoFTWARE PROTECTION: THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SPEAKS ON THE COM-
PUTER/COPYRIGHT INTERFACE 367-70 (1984). Video games for use in arcades generally are en-
coded in ROM, and the video game industry has successfully relied on copyright law to combat
unauthorized duplication, distribution, and importation. For a discussion of copyright law in the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss1/12
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use of copyrighted circuit boards constitutes a public performance.41
Similar to the Third Circuit's decisions in Redd Home42 and Aveco,43 the
Fourth Circuit's opinion emphasized the public nature of the video
arcade enterprise as a whole, despite the fact that only one person at a
time could play the game.' The court in Taito concluded that because
the arcade was open to the general public, the video games were publicly
performed.45
In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Professional Real Estate Investors,
Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a hotel authorized public
performances of copyrighted videodiscs when the hotel rented them to its
guests to view on videodisc players installed in the hotel rooms.4 7 The
court applied section 101 of the Act4" to determine whether the vide-
odiscs were performed in a "public place."'49 The court held that in-
room viewing of a videodisc was a private performance,50 distinguishing
it from the private booth viewings involved in the Third Circuit's Redd
Home and Aveco decisions.51
The Ninth Circuit, in Professional Real Estate, recognized that in both
Redd Home and Aveco, the relevant place of performance was the entire
video store, which was open to the public, rather than the individual
booths, which were not.52 However, the Professional Real Estate court
distinguished Redd Home and Aveco on the basis that, in those cases,
video cassette rental was central to the defendants' businesses. Ih Profes-
sional Real Estate, however, the "nature" of La Mancha's business was
the provision of hotel accommodations and services, to which the rental
video game context, see Baumgarten, Copyright and Computer Software (Including Data Bases &
Chip Technology), in A. MILLER, supra, at 171, 209.
41. 883 F.2d at 278.
42. See 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984); supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
43. See 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986); supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
44. 883 F.2d at 278-79.
45. Id. at 279. Indeed, Red Baron intended to attract as many members of the general public as
possible. Id.
46. 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 279-80.
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); supra note 8.
49. 866 F.2d at 280-81 (construing the "public place" clause of § 101). Also essential to the
court's ultimate holding was an application of the "transmit" clause. See supra note 8.
50. 866 F.2d at 281-82.
51. Id. at 281. See supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's treat-
ment of the term "public").
52. 866 F.2d at 280-81.
1990]
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of videodiscs was only incidental.53
The court further reasoned that a hotel room is, in many ways, private:
once rented, the room is no longer open to the general public;54 fourth
amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure apply to
rented rooms;55 and, finally, "common experience" showed that hotel
guests enjoy a substantial amount of privacy not unlike the privacy in the
patrons' own homes.56
Although the Ninth Circuit arrived at an intuitively correct decision, it
failed to explain its result in a way that withstands close scrutiny. The
principal logical difficulty with the Ninth Circuit's analysis is that hotel
rooms are open to the public. Admittedly, the individual hotel guest
who "performs" a videodisc in a reserved hotel room is performing it
privately, a situation analogous to home viewing.57 From the perspective
of the hotel enterprise, however, the hotel rooms are open to the public in
much the same way that the viewing booths or video games were open to
the public in Redd Home, Aveco, and Taito.58 Under this earlier analy-
sis-implicitly adopted by the Professional Real Estate court 9 -the vide-
odisc performances in the hotel guest rooms would be public even though
each individual performance is viewed only by an individual and perhaps
53. Id. at 281. The court asserted that the defendant's hotel operation "may incidentally in-
clude the rental of videodiscs to interested guests for viewing in guest rooms." Id. The court re-
ferred to the nature of the business in two ways. First, it referred to "the nature of [the] stores,"
meaning that the video store in Redd Home was open to the general public. Id. Second, the court
referred to the "nature" of La Mancha's business, meaning the hotel business rathe" than the video
business. Id. The court's use of the term "nature" to describe the hotel's business distinguishes
Professional Real Estate from the earlier cases and from Taito. See supra notes 14-45 and accompa-
nying text.
54. 866 F.2d at 281.
55. Id. (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)). See Shipley, supra note 12, at 490
(fourth amendment decisions traditionally regard hotel rooms as private). But cf Comment, supra
note 23 (individual's fourth amendment rights irrelevant to the issue of public performance rights
under copyright law). See also infra note 60.
56. 866 F.2d at 281. The court proffered an additional argument based on the legislative his-
tory behind the first clause in the statutory definition of "publicly." Id. at 281 (quoting HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 12, at 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5677-78).
The court conluded from its survey of congressional comments that neither the number of persons
attending the performance nor the exact location determines whether a performance is public for
copyright purposes. Id. The court then stated simply that, because in-room videodisc performances
would normally be regarded as private, the performances were not at a "'place open to the public'"
for purposes of the Copyright Act. Id.
57. See supra note 23; notes 54-56 and accompanying text. See also M. NIMMER, supra note 12,
§ 8.14 [C][3]; Shipley, supra note 12, at 491; infra note 60.
58. See supra notes 14-45 and accompanying text.
59. See 866 F.2d at 281.
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a few friends or family members." The determination of whether a per-
formance has occurred in a public facility cannot alone justify the differ-
ent outcomes between the Third and Fourth Circuit decisions and that in
Professional Real Estate.
To reach its intuited result, the Ninth Circuit implicitly must have
added a second step to the analysis. Beyond whether the facility as a
whole was public, the court looked at the relationship of the performance
with the "nature" of the enterprise.6" Because the performance of copy-
righted works in Professional Real Estate was only incidental to the "na-
ture" of the enterprise, the performance was not public within the
meaning of the Copyright Act.6 2
The Ninth Circuit's result is analytically sound from an economic
standpoint as well. By inquiring whether the copyright holder is losing
proceeds from market expenditures for its product, one can easily distin-
guish Professional Real Estate from Redd Home and Aveco. The con-
sumer who considers leaving home to watch a movie chooses between
video stores with booths-as in Redd Home and Aveco-and a public
theater, which pays a public performance royalty. Conversely, the con-
sumer who decides to rent a movie on a supplied videodisc player
chooses between the hotel's selection and that of a local video store,
which pays no public performance royalty. 63 The copyright holder
60. The court failed to distinguish between arguments demonstrating that a hotel room is pri-
vate from a guest's point of view and arguments exonerating from infringement the hotel enterprise
as a whole. The invocation of the hotel guest's fourth amendment rights, for example, shows only
that the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is the same in the hotel room as in the
individual's home. Likewise, the fact that a hotel guest's room, once rented, is not open to anyone
else evidences only the private nature of the hotel room from the guest's perspective.
Furthermore, fourth amendment protection extends to any place reasonably regarded as private.
Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 699, reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 1659 (1989). See also New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986). Thus, the fourth amendment arguably protects a patron in a video booth similar to
that in Redd Horne or Aveco. See supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit in
Professional Real Estate, however, failed to distinguish the hotel rooms from the video booths in the
earlier cases. See 866 F.2d at 280-81. See also Comment, supra note 23, at 103.
61. 866 F.2d at 281.
62. Id. at 281-82. The Ninth Circuit explained that "La Mancha's operation differs from those
in Aveco and Redd Home because its 'nature' is the providing of living accommodations and general
hotel services, which may incidentally include the rental of videodiscs to interested guests for view-
ing in guest rooms." Id. at 281. This is an intuitively valid distinction.
63. See supra note 15. One cannot argue that the home video system differs from a hotel-
installed system. Congress stated that "no special exception is needed to make clear that the mere
placing of an ordinary radio or television set in a private hotel room does not constitute an infringe-
ment." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 91-92, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
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therefore loses money if video stores with booths do not pay the public
performance royalty that public theaters pay.6'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that La Mancha is not liable for
copyright infringement. The court implicitly created a two-step test to
determine the meaning of "publicly" under the 1976 Copyright Act. 65
First, a court must apply the statute's language to the entire enterprise
rather than the individual performances.66 Second, if the entire enter-
prise is open to the public, the court must inquire further whether the
apparently private performances comprise the principal business of the
enterprise.67 If they do, then the performances infringe on the copy-
right;68 if they do not, then there is no infringement. 69 This two-step test
allows courts to distinguish consistently between infringing public per-
formances and noninfringing private performances of copyrighted works.
Roger W. Wallach
NEws at 5706. Likewise, no express exception should be required to establish the right of a hotel to
put a videodisc player in its rooms as well. Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act specifically does not
consider as an infringement "the public reception or the transmission on a single receiving apparatus
of a kind commonly used in private homes .. " 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1988). Congress has explained
that the purpose of § 110(5) "is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns on, in a
public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to mem-
bers of the public for private use." HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 86, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5700. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 487-88, 491 n.116.
64. Note that both the hotel and the local video store have paid the purchase price for their
videodiscs. Thus, the copyright holder captures the same market expenditure from the consumer
who rents a videodisc from the hotel and one who rents from the local video store. The copyright
holder loses nothing if the hotel does not pay a public performance royalty.
65. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
66. 866 F.2d at 281.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 14-45 and accompanying text.
69. Professional Real Estate, 866 F.2d at 282.
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